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Cutting Cops Too Much Slack 
 
WAYNE A. LOGAN* 
  
 
 Police officers can make mistakes, which, for better or worse, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has often seen fit to forgive. Police, for instance, can make 
mistakes of fact when assessing whether circumstances justify the seizure 
of an individual1 or search of a residence;2 they can even be mistaken about 
the identity of those they arrest. 3 This essay examines yet another, arguably 
more significant context where police mistakes are forgiven: when they 
seize a person based on their misunderstanding of what a law prohibits.   
Although such a seizure might seem the epitome of unreasonable be-
havior proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, 4 the Supreme Court has disa-
greed. In 1979, in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 5 the Court’s thinking on the 
question started out modestly enough when a six-member majority con-
cluded that police can arrest for violation of a law later deemed unconstitu-
tional. “Society,” the Court reasoned, “would be ill-served if its police took 
it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitu-
tionally entitled to enforcement.”6 In 2004, in Devenpeck v. Alford, 7 the 
Court went a step farther, unanimously holding that police can arrest an in-
dividual for conduct that is not prohibited by law, so long as facts known to 
the officer afford probable cause to believe that another lawful basis to ar-
rest exists.8  
DeFillippo and Devenpeck, while debatable on their doctrinal merits, at 
                                                 
*   Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of 
Law. Thanks to Andrew Ferguson, David Logan, Tracey Maclin, Richard Re, and Chris 
Slobogin for their helpful comments. 
1.   Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (arrest); see also, e.g., 
United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (investigatory stop).  
2.   Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (whether a third party has au-
thority to consent to search of premises); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987) 
(whether residence searched is that specified in warrant).    
3.   Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).  
4.   U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons 
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).  
5.   443 U.S. 31 (1979).  
6.   Id. at 38.  
7.   543 U.S. 146 (2004).   
8.   Id. at 153–55.  
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least shared a common virtue: in both cases the seizures were somehow le-
gally justified when they occurred. This past Term, however, in Heien v. 
North Carolina,9 the Court took a quantum leap in the latitude it affords 
police, validating a traffic stop based on an officer’s misunderstanding of 
law when no other legal basis justified the stop.  
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts proclaimed that “[t]o be 
reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for 
some mistakes by government officials,”10 whether regarding fact or law.11 
Officers in the field, he reasoned, “deserve a margin of error” for the often 
“quick decision[s]” they must make.12 Even though the officer in Heien 
wrongly believed that the law required two (not one) operable brake lights 
on a car, his mistake was a reasonable one given the law’s purported uncer-
tainty, justifying the seizure (and admission of contraband later discov-
ered). 13  
Surprisingly, Heien was met with near silence by the nation’s editorial 
pages14 and inspired only a single dissent, by Justice Sotomayor.15 Justice 
Sotomayor condemned her colleagues’ blithe equating of factual determi-
nations by police and their understanding of the laws that they enforce. Fac-
tual determinations, she noted, are probabilistic by their very nature, requir-
ing officers to utilize their training and experience to make often quick de-
ductions about possible criminal misconduct.16 “The same cannot be said 
about legal exegesis,” Justice Sotomayor observed. “‘[T]he notion that the 
law is definite and knowable’ sits at the foundation of our legal system. And 
                                                 
9.   135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).  
10.  Id. at 536.  
11.  Id.  
12.  Id. at 539.  
13.  Id. at 540.  
14.  Among the nation’s leading newspapers, only the Los Angeles Times published 
an editorial critical of Heien. See Editorial, Ignorance of the Law Isn’t an Acceptable De-
fense, Even for Police, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-
ed-ignorance-of-the-law-supreme-court-20141216-story.html. 
15.  Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan, joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, concurred “in full” in the result, noting that “[i]f the statute is genuinely 
ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, 
then the officer has made a reasonable mistake.” Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined 
by Ginsburg, J.). According to the concurrence, the statute at issue “pose[d] a quite difficult 
question of interpretation,” and the officer’s “judgment, although overturned, had much to 
recommend it.” Id. at 542. 
16.  Id. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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it is courts, not officers, that are in the best position to interpret the laws.”17 
“What matters . . . [is] the rule of law—not an officer’s conception of the 
rule of law, and not even an officer’s reasonable misunderstanding about 
the law, but the law.”18 
Condoning reasonable mistakes of law by police, Justice Sotomayor fur-
ther noted, undermines the critically important law-clarification function of 
courts. A court now need only determine whether an officer’s mistake was 
reasonable, avoiding the need to conclusively interpret the law in ques-
tion.19 “This result is bad for citizens, who need to know their rights and 
responsibilities, and it is bad for police who would benefit from clearer di-
rection.”20 “One wonders,” Justice Sotomayor wrote, “how a citizen seek-
ing to be law-abiding and to structure his or her behavior to avoid these 
invasive, frightening, and humiliating encounters could do so.”21   
While the foregoing points are spot-on, Justice Sotomayor failed to fully 
catalog the difficulties presented by Heien. While it is certainly true that 
Heien obviates the need for courts to clarify uncertain laws, it also affects 
the work of legislatures. By imposing a standard-like rule of reasonableness, 
which functions only to expand (and never contract) the prohibitory scope 
of a law,22 Heien allocated law-making power to police.23 Empowering po-
lice in this way not only raises separation of powers concerns;24 it will also 
undermine the quality of laws actually codified by legislatures. Lawmakers, 
perhaps already predisposed to enact broad provisions to facilitate law en-
forcement,25 will now have even less reason to avoid textual imprecision 
                                                 
17.  Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
418 (1981)). 
18.  Id. at 542.  
19.  Id. at 544. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id.  
22.  As Anthony Amsterdam long ago noted, use of a reasonableness standard can 
be “splendid in its flexibility, [and] awful in its unintelligibility, unadministrability, unen-
forcibility and general ooziness.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 415 (1974).     
23.  See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) (con-
doning police mistakes of law allows police to “sweep behavior into [a] statute which the 
authors of the statutes may have had in mind but failed to put into the plain language of the 
statute”).     
24.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456–61 (2010) (discussing institutional allocation of authority to leg-
islatures to identify and codify criminal law norms).  
25.  See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365–66 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
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because Heien allows police to make interpretive mistakes in their applica-
tion.26 
The resulting legal indeterminacy will be especially problematic with 
malum prohibitum offenses, such as that at issue in Heien. Before Heien, 
discretionary enforcement of laws regulating such offenses was marked by 
what Professor Bill Stuntz called a de facto “kind of lawlessness.”27 So long 
as they had probable cause or reasonable suspicion that an offense occurred, 
police could (but need not) seize an alleged violator,28 even if they did so 
as a pretext to investigate other criminal activity. 29 After Heien, this author-
ity remains (as the circumstances in Heien itself highlight30), but it has been 
complemented by a de jure kind of lawlessness. Whereas historically police 
had reason to narrowly interpret laws31 for fear that a mistake of law would 
trigger the exclusionary rule,32 they now have strategic reason to expan-
                                                 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
534–35 (2001).   
26.  And police trainers, mindful that reasonable mistakes are forgiven, will now 
have less incentive to elucidate perhaps unclear laws. 
27.  Stuntz, supra note 25, at 597.  
28.  See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 391 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A] basic principle of the Fourth Amendment [is] that law en-
forcement officials can enforce with the same vigor all rules and regulations irrespective 
of the perceived importance of any of those rules.”).  
29.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).   
30.  The officer in Heien admitted that he was looking for “criminal indicators” in 
passing cars, decided to pursue Heien’s vehicle because the driver had his “hands at a 10 
and 2 position looking straight ahead,” and after following the vehicle used the alleged 
brake light violation to initiate a stop. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 18, Heien v. North Car-
olina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604), available at http://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-604_pet_reply
.authcheckdam.pdf. The officer was thus not faced with what the Heien majority later 
called the need to make a “quick decision.” Id.    
31.  See, e.g., Malcomson v. Scott, 23 N.W. 166, 168 (Mich. 1885) (“An officer of 
justice is bound to know what the law is, and if the facts on which he proceeds, if true, 
would not justify action under the law, he is a wrong-doer.”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 86 (1965) (noting traditional 
view that police should “employ a very strict construction [of statutes], particularly in 
doubtful cases”); United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2013) (ex-
pressing “hope that [an officer] would clarify his understanding of any unclear provision 
before bringing the full force of the law upon an unsuspecting citizen”). 
32.  See, e.g., United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006); United States 
v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006); State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 824 
(Minn. 2004); State v. Lacsella, 60 P.3d 975, 981 (Mont. 2002).   
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sively interpret laws in the hope that their mistake will later be deemed rea-
sonable, allowing for the “bigger” busts that they very often are after. 33  
The impact of this shift will not be felt by individuals alone. Rather, as 
Justice Sotomayor recognized, Heien will have broader “human conse-
quences—including . . . for communities and for their relationships with the 
police.”34 Allowing police officers, the public face and embodiment of the 
law,35 to flout the laws they enforce surely will do nothing to instill com-
munity confidence in the fairness and competence of police.36 Nor will such 
confidence be served by the troubling asymmetry that Heien creates: going 
forward, reasonable mistakes of law by police will be excused, but those of 
citizens generally will not.37 To the Heien majority, the asymmetry had only 
“rhetorical appeal,”38 because mistake of law doctrine is all about criminal 
liability:  
 
Just as an individual generally cannot escape criminal li-
ability based on a mistaken understanding of the law, so 
too the government cannot impose criminal liability based 
on a mistaken understanding of the law. . . . But just be-
cause mistakes of law cannot justify either the imposition 
or avoidance of criminal liability, it does not follow that 
they cannot justify an investigatory stop.39   
 
 The petitioner in Heien, however, did not challenge a ticket or convic-
tion for a brake-light violation. Rather, he challenged an investigatory 
                                                 
33.  See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L  REV. 
1243, 1248 (2010) (describing police use of traffic stops as bases for drug interdiction).   
34.  Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).   
35.  See ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 175 (1971) (“The legal 
exercise of police authority reinforces the right of police to use it, while its illegal exercise 
undermines the broader acceptance of the authority as legitimate.”). 
36.  As the procedural justice literature attests, the public’s perception of the fairness 
and legitimacy of police can negatively affect community willingness to cooperate with 
and defer to police authority. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legiti-
macy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and En-
gagement, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 78 (2014); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Le-
gitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help Police Fight Crime in Their Communi-
ties?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008).   
37.  See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §13.01 (6th 
ed., 2012).  
38.  Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).  
39.  Id.  
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stop40—a Fourth Amendment seizure that the Court somehow felt justified 
in treating as a safe harbor for mistakes of law. Why police should be al-
lowed to err in favor of legal over-inclusiveness when stopping a vehicle, 
while motorists are not forgiven their mistakes of legal under-inclusiveness 
when they drive one, remains unclear. It would appear that the Court was 
motivated in part by the view that being detained by police is a trivial event. 
As Justice Sotomayor observed, however, a police seizure can be an “inva-
sive, frightening, and humiliating” experience.41  
Again, however, Justice Sotomayor failed to fully capture the signifi-
cance of the majority’s decision to expand police authority to execute stops. 
When police execute a traffic stop, for instance, they can order the driver 
and any passengers to exit the vehicle42 and can ask a barrage of unrelated 
questions intended to elicit incriminating information.43 If an officer be-
lieves a weapon is present, she can conduct a frisk,44 which the Court has 
described as “a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal se-
curity.”45 Or the officer can simply ask for consent to search, as occurred in 
Heien, which need not be accompanied by any advisement that the request 
can be refused.46  
The Court’s safe harbor, while bad enough in itself, has a troublesome 
capacity to expand in at least two important respects. First, even though 
Heien concerned a misdemeanor traffic offense, the principle it endorsed—
as with Fourth Amendment doctrine more generally47—applies to enforce-
ment of laws concerning serious and non-serious offenses alike. For citi-
zens, this means that the risk of being unlawfully seized will grow as already 
overstuffed state, local, and federal legal codes continue to expand. Second, 
Heien’s reasoning will likely be applied beyond the context of investigative 
stops. Already, at least one court has invoked Heien to validate an arrest 
                                                 
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
42.  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (passengers); Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (driver). 
43.  Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01 (2005).  
44.  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S 323, 334 (2009).   
45.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968).   
46.  United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002). 
47.  See William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the 
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 875 (2001).   
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based on an officer’s mistake of law.48 When this occurs, individuals expe-
rience an even greater degree of physical coercion49 and a complete 
search,50 possibly of their naked bodies.51  
In the final analysis, the result in Heien perhaps should not come as a 
surprise given the Court’s view of the burdens citizens can be rightfully 
expected to bear when assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness. The 
calculus was on notable display in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,52 when the 
Court upheld the arrest of a motorist for failing to wear a seatbelt, which the 
majority acknowledged to be a “pointless indignity” and “gratuitous humil-
iation[] imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely 
poor judgment.”53 In so deciding, the Court refused to draw a constitutional 
distinction between jailable and non-jailable offenses, stating that “we can-
not expect every police officer to know the details of frequently complex 
penalty schemes.”54 It also rejected adoption of a “simple tie breaker for the 
police to follow in the field: if in doubt, do not arrest.”55  
Heien likewise deferred to the enforcement challenges faced by police, 
prompting Justice Sotomayor to wonder “why an innocent citizen should be 
made to shoulder the burden of being seized whenever the law may be sus-
ceptible to an interpretive question.”56 By sacrificing legality concerns on 
the altar of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, the Court has sent a power-
ful message: that government can now enact imprecise laws and then en-
force them “against a defendant.”57 Being seized by police when you have 
done nothing wrong is now simply something that must be tolerated, much 
like the “pointless indignity” and “gratuitous humiliation[]” suffered by the 
                                                 
48.  See People v. Campuzano, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 592 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. 2015) (upholding arrest based on officer’s misinterpretation of ordinance prohibiting 
operation of a bicycle on a sidewalk “fronting” a business).   
49.  See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (describing arrest as “a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person 
seized is guilty or innocent”).  
50.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). In the auto context, an 
arrest can allow police to search the arrestee’s car, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 
(2009), and impound and inventory its contents, Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 
(1987).  
51.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012).  
52.  532 U.S. 318 (2001).  
53.  Id. at 346–47.  
54.  Id. at 348.  
55.  Id. at 350.  
56.  Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 546 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).   
57.  United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003).  
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motorist in Atwater.58 
Fifty years ago, Professor Wayne LaFave wrote that “[i]t is obviously 
important to determine how . . . criminal statutes should be interpreted by 
law enforcement personnel who must decide whether to arrest.”59 Until 
Heien, the baseline was clear enough: police mistakes of law, even those 
based on reasonable misunderstanding, were condemned.60 With Heien, the 
Supreme Court has taken us on a different path, one far more deferential to 
police than the citizens that they take an oath to protect and serve. Amid 
troubling reports of police overreach in Ferguson, Missouri and else-
where,61 allowing police to seize individuals when they have done nothing 
wrong is a very regrettable development indeed. For citizens like Sandra 
Bland in Texas, already uncertain about what a “lawful order” from police 
might mean, life on the streets will now be even more unpredictable and 
problematic.62 
                                                 
58.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001).  
59.  LAFAVE, supra note 31, at 85.  
60.  See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.     
61.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGU-
SON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1
.pdf.   
62.  Orin Kerr, Sandra Bland and the ‘Lawful Order’ Problem, WASH. POST, July 
23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/23/san-
dra-bland-and-the-lawful-order-problem. 
